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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S CREDIT PROGRAMS
Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director
Center for the Study of American Business
Washington University
The arsenal of governmental power over the economy is extensive, in-

.

-

eluding the authority to tax, the ability to spend the proceeds of that
taxation, and the capability of issuing rules and regulations determining
or influencing private behavior.

One of the lesser known components of

that arsenal is the government's power to provide credit to various individuals and orqanizations in the economy.
As will be demonstrated, most of the credit activities do not appear
in the federal budget.
ture at all.

Many do not involve any direct federal expendi-

Hence, they seem to be a rather painless way of achieving

national objectives.

In the main, the federal government is "merely ..

guaranteeing private borrowing or sponsoring ostensibly private institutions.

...

.: ·

Is this use of the governme.nt '·.$.·c-redit power- a variation of the
proverbi a1 "free 1unch? ''

Let us examine the costs as we 11 as the benefits

that may flow from this often overlooked aspect of qovernmental interaction with the private sector.
The Variety of Governnent Credit Programs
Over the years substantial numbers of credit programs have made their
ll

way through the legislative process of the federal government.
programs emerged on

an~

These

hoc basis, with each program directed toward

providinq assistance in overcoming a specific problem at hand.

As a re-

sult of this gradual but very substantial accretion, federal credit program subsidies are now provided to a great many and variety of sectors of
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the American economy -- housing, agriculture, transportation,

healt~,

education, state and local governments, small business -- as well as to
foreigners.lf The total amount of credit provided under federal auspices

.-

has risen substantially during the past decade.
There are three major uses of the federal government•s credit power
(see Table 1 for details).
Direct loans by federal departments and agencies.

Direct loans ex-

tended by federal agencies, such as the two percent loans made by the
Rural Electrification Administration, generally involve significant subsidies because the loans are made at interest rates below those available
in the private sector.

In many cases, the government also absorbs the

administrative expenses

~nd

losses arising from loan defaults, thus

further increasing the amount of the subsidy.

Although not formally con-

sidered a federal credit program, the relatively generous progress payments made by the Department of Defense represent interest-free provision
of working capital to government contractors on a very large scale.
Direct loans are still an important form of federal credit aid, accounting for almost $28 billion of the total of $99 billion of federal and
federally-assisted credit extended during the fiscal year 1975.

However,

in recent years direct loans have been exceeded in size by the various
guarantee programs and lending activities of government-sponsored but
privately-owned credit agencies.
'p

Moreover, a rising share -- almost one-fifth in fiscal 1975 -- of
these direct loans have been excluded from the budget totals.

These are

the lending activities of the so-called off-budget agencies of the federal
government, such as the Rural Electrification Administration and the

- 3 Table 1
MAJOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 1975
(New Commitments, in millions)
...
Ill

-

-

Category
and Agency

Government
Direct Loans
Guaranteed Sponsored
On Budget Off Budget
Loans
Enterprises Total

Aid to Business
Commerce
Interior
Transportation
Export-Import Bank
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
General Services
Administration
Small Business Administration
U.S. Railway Association
Subtotal

$15
22
37

$699
$3,813

100

520

177
8,708

714
22
214
12,521

1,723

1,823

72

72

1,365

1,885
34
17,285

34
694

3,847

12,744

6,329

1,060

8,577

1,060

8,577

Aid to Farmers
Agriculture
Farm credit agencies
Subtotal

6,329

$20,910

15,966
20,910

20,910

36,876

Aid to Local Governments
Housing and Urban
Development
Justice
District of Columbia

590
40
232

1,252

1,842
40
232

862

1,252

2,114

543
~felfare
Housing and Urban
11,779
Development
524
Veterans Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank
System
1,305
Federal National Mortgage
Association
Student Loan Marketing
Association

1,388

1,931

Subtotal
.,.

Aid to Individuals
Health, Education, and

Subtotal

14,151

4,791.!/
3,60211

9,781

16,570
4,126
12,694

13,999

4,434

4,434

144

144

17,272

41,204

- 4Table 1 (continued)

"'

-

.
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Category
and Agency

Government
Guaranteed Sponsored
Direct Loans
On Budget Off Budget
Loans
Enteq~ri ses Total

Aid to Foreign Governments
Security assistance
Development assistance
Subtotal

437
478

616
26

1,053
504

915

642

1,557

95

6

101

95

6

101

Miscellaneous
Federal Financing Bankl!
All other
Subtotal
GRAND TOTAL

23,046

4,907

33,002

38,182

99,137

1/ Duplicate transactions have been eliminated.
Source:

Compiled from Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1977.
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Export-Import Bank.

These latter agencies are all part of the federal

government, using federal funds and federal employees to carry on their
activities.
'~

-·

Their common characteristic is that in each case the Congress

has passed a law stipulating that some or all of their financial transactions are not to be included in the budget.

The justification often

given is that these programs will ultimately generate offsetting revenues
and hence be no burden to the taxpayer.
dubious value.
budget outlays.

However, this rationale is of

First of all, those revenues may not always equal the offAnd, secondly, many government programs which are included

in the budget also generate offsetting receipts.

Thus, the off-budget

treatment is a subterfuge for understating the size of the budget and a
mechanism for diluting the effectiveness of the budgetary review process.
Loans guaranteed by federal departments and agencies.
now account for a major share of federal credit programs.

Loan guarantees
The attractive-

ness of this mechanism to government policymakers stems largely from the
fact that the loans themselves are made by private lenders and thus are
excluded from the federal budget.

Technically, all that the government

does is to assume a contingent liability to pay the private lender if the
private borrower defaults.

Loans in this category include housing subsidy

programs,some of which have experienced very high default rates in spite
~

of their being backed by the security of real. property.

Other new pro-

grams generate higher risks because they frequently.guarantee loans which
require little or no collateral in connection with the guarantee.
During the last several years, however, an interesting but unexpected
movement has occurred between this category and direct off-budget loans.
This has resulted from the formation of the Federal Financing Bank.

The

- 6 -

basic reason for the Bank's establishment was to consolidate the market
borrowings of the ri s i n·g · number of federa 1 credit agencies.

Such con so 1i-

dation, it was reasoned, should enable the various federal credit agencies

..

-

to raise funds at lower interest rates and also provide the Treasury
Department with greater control over the timing and amount of borrowings
by these agencies.
pose.

To a substantial extent, the Bank has served that pur-

However, its charter also gives it the authority to purchase many

of the private loans which carry a federal guarantee.

As a result, some

of the effort to reduce the pressure on the budget via extending guarantees
is being offset by rising federal borrowings to finance the repurchase of
these guarantees.

This involuted procedure is hard to defend on any ra-

tional ground.
Loans by federally-sponsored agencies, such as the Federal National
Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the farm credit
agencies.

These ostensibly private institutions are not included in the

total of federal spending.

They rais~ 'their funds primarily through bor-

rowing in the nation's capital markets.

However, these privately-owned

agencies possess various tax advantages and are able to borrow funds in
the market at low interest rates because of the implicit government backing of their debentures and other issues.
•

The best known of these agencies, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fanny Mae), has far more ties to the federal government than
does the customary private corporation.

The Secretary of Housing and Urban

Development, for example, is given "general regulatory power 11 in the company's charter.

The Secretary of the Treasury must approve each of its

sales of securities.

The President appoints one-third of the membership
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of its board of directors.

Loans made by Fanny Mae and the other federal-

ly-sponsored agencies have increased sharply over the past decade.
~I

They

now comprise the largest single form of federal credit assistance to the
private sector.
Impacts on Total Saving and Investment
The conclusions of the empirical literature on the impacts of federal
credit programs on saving and investment are clear.

These programs do

little if anything to increase the total flow of saving or investment in
the American economy.

They mainly change the share of investment funds

going to a given industry or sector of the economy and, in the process of
doing so, exert upward pressures on interest rates as investment funds are
bid away from other sectors.
In commenting on existing programs of federally-assisted credit to
the private sector, Dr. Henry Kaufman, the distinguished economist with
the investment house of Salomon Brothers, has written:
financing does not do anything directly to

~nlarge

"Federal agency

the supply of savings ...

In contrast, as agency financing bids for the limited supply of savings
with other credit demanders, it helps to bid up the price of money."?:!
In referring to borrowing by the federal government and its agencies,
Dr. Albert Wojnilower has made a similar observation:
"Because these governmental borrowers need have few
if any worries about creditworthiness· or meeting
interest payments, they can preempt as much of the
credit markets as they choose. As a result, the
Federal sector has become one of the most relentless
sources of upward pressures on interest rates."3/
Even the supporters of proposed credit subsidies for energy development admit to this effect.

The following is taken from the statement to
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the House Science and Technology Committee by Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury Gerald Parsky, who was testifying in favor of financial incentives for synthetic fuel demonstration plants:

.

Such incentives increase the demand for capital
while having little or no effect on the overall
supply of capital. They tend to cause interest
rates to rise and channel capital away from more
economic to less economic uses...
·
11

-

In a comprehensive study of federal credit programs for the prestigious Commission on Money and Credit, Warren Law of Harvard University concluded that they have created inflationary pressures in every year since
World War II.Y Professor Patricia Bowers has noted what she terms
of federal credit programs.

11

COsts 11

One cost arises from the fact that, given the

availability of funds, an: increase in credit for housing means lesser
amounts for other borrowers.

The two borrowing groups most adversely af-

fected by tight credit are state and local governments and small businesses.
A further cost is that the operations of the federal credit agencies tend
to increase the level of interest rates· above . the level that' would have
prevailed if they had not entered the credit markets.§!
This phenomenon occurs for a variety of reasons.

The total supply

of funds is broadly determined by household and business saving and the
ability of banks to increase the money supply.

This is the basic limit

on the availability of funds referred to by Professor Bowers.
response of financial markets to an increase in

th~

The normal

demand for funds by

a borrower, such as is represented by a federal credit program, is an increase in interest rates so as to balance out the demand for funds with
the supply of saving.

But the federal government's demand for funds is

"interest-inelastic" (the Treasury will generally raise the money that it
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requires regardless of the interest rate) and the interest-elasticity of
saving is relatively modest.

.

Thus, weak and marginal borrowers will be

"rationed" out of financial markets in the process while the Treasury
-

and other borrowers pay higher rates of interest.

The General Accounting

Office has noted this shortcoming in its analysis of the proposed Energy
Independence Authority:
"The EIA•s ... guarantees would make projects it
assists financially more attractive to private
capital than conservation projects not backed by
Federal guarantees. Thus, both its loans and
its guarantees will siphon private capital away
from those conservation projects which might have
been able to obtain private financing in the absence of EIA operations."
Government credit programs thus can have very different impacts on
resource allocation than is the case with typical government tax and expenditure actions.
consumption.

Taxation, for example, most heavily affects current

As Norman H. Jones, Jr. has pointed out, if the Congress

were to decide to promote more investment in synthetic fuels production
through direct expenditures, most of tha funds to finance these outlays
would be pulled away from current c~~~umption via taxation. 6/
But if the energy development were to be supported by deficit financing or government credit guarantees, the resources would be supplied at
the expense of other capital demands.

And as pointed out earlier, that

would likely hit housing and small business loans disproportionately hard.
'P

Important insights into the effects of federal credit programs on
capital markets have been provided by Bruce MacLaury, the President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and a former deputy undersecretary of
·the Treasury:
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The more or less unfettered expansion of Federal
credit programs and the accompanying deluge of
agency direct and guaranteed securities to be
financed in the credit markets has undoubtedly
permitted Congress and the Administration to claim
that wonder of wonders -- something for nothing,
or almost nothing. But as with all such sleightof-hand feats, the truth is somewhat different."?/
11

"' .

Dr. Maclaury goes on to point out that there are extra costs associated
with introducing new government credit agencies to the capital markets.
These costs involve selling issues that are smaller than some mtnimum
efficiently tradeable size, and selling securities that only in varying
degree approximate the characteristics of direct government debt in terms
of perfection of guarantee, flexibility of timing and maturities,
ness'' of instrument, et

c~tera.

11

Clean-

As a result of such considerations, the

market normally charges a premium over the interest cost on direct
government debt of comparable maturity.

That premium ranges

from~

of one

percent on the well-known federally-sponsored agencies such as Federal
National Mortgage Association to more than
New Community Bonds.

~

percent on such exotics as

In general, if cost of financing were the only con-

sideration, it would be most efficient to have the Treasury itself provide the financing for direct loans by issuing government debt in the
market.
Reduced efficiency occurs in the economy by providing a federal
11

Umbrella" over many credit activities without dist.inguishing their rela-

tive credit risks.

A basic function that credit markets are supposed to

perform is that of distinguishing different credit risks and assigning
appropriate risk premia.

This is the essence of the ultimate resource-

allocation function of credit markets.

As an increasing proportion of
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issues coming to the credit markets bears the guarantee of the federal
government, the ability of the market to differentiate credit risks inevitably diminishes.

,

..

Theoretically, the federal agencies issuing or

guaranteeing debt would perform this role, charging as costs of the programs differing rates of insurance premia.

In practice, all of the pres-

sures are against such differential pricing of risks.~ This is a hidden
cost of federal credit programs.
Professor Henry Jacoby of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
discussed these concerns before the House Committee on Science and
Technology while advocating a limited program of loan guarantees for
synthetic fuel development:
The problem with loan guarantees is that they tend
to hide the true cost of the technology that is being demonstrated ... Thus the guarantee carries a hidden subsidy which masks the real economic cost of
the energy produced - or saved - and clouds the
issue of what the 'commercial' status of the technology would be without the guarantee ...
11

Impacts on Sectors of the Economy
The very nature of federal credit assistance is to create advantages
for some groups of borrowers and disadvantages for others.

The literature

provides clear answers on who will tend to be rationed out in the process.
It is unlikely to be the large well-known corporations or the U. S.
Government.

It is more likely to be state and

loc~l

governments, medium-

sized businesses, private mortgage borrowers not under the federal umbrella,
and consumers, thereby contributing to additional economic and financial
concentration in the United States.
The competition for funds by the rapidly expanding federal credit
programs also increases the cost to the taxpayer by raising the interest

- 12 -

rate at which the Treasury borrows its own funds.

As shown in Table 2,

there has been a massive expansion in the size and relative importance of
·\ ·

federa 1 government credit demands over the past decade.

In 1960, the

federal share of funds raised in private capital markets, using the Federal
Reserve System•s flow-of-funds data, was about 12 percent.

By 1970, the

government•s share had risen to 23 percent, and reached 36 percent in 1975.
Virtually every session of the Congress in recent years has enacted
additional federal credit programs.

Since 1960, the Federal National

Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) has been joined by the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginne Mae), Student Loan Marketing Association
(Sally Mae), and, most recently, the U. S. Railway Association (Fannie
Rae).
Subsidies in Credit Programs
Substantial subsidy elements exist in most federal credit programs,
which of course make these activities especially attractive to the recipients of the benefits.

The subsidy element is fundamental, in that the

basic purpose of the government involvement in credit activities is to
provide certain categories of borrowers with credit on terms that are more
favorable than those available in private markets. 9/
As stated by the President•s Commission on Budget Concepts:
Most Federal loan programs contain at least some
element of subsidy. In fact, if this were not
true, a serious question could be raised about
the appropriateness of such activities being conducted by the Federal Government rather than ~Y
private financial institutions. To the extent
that Federal loans include a subsidy element by
lending at more favorable interest rates than the
cost of money to the Government (or the even higher
cost of money obtained through private sources)
they are at least in part grants or transfer payments rather than loans. 10/
11

11

Source:

p

Federal Reserve System flow-of-funds accounts, Treasury Department data.
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To the extent that subsidies help to achieve social goals, by shifting
resource use to patterns closer to the society's priorities, they can be
~-

regarded as beneficial.

At the heart of a subsidy is a political decision

to favor some at the expense of others.

Because a credit subsidy involves

a balancing of interests, it would be useful to have fairly well-developed
notions regarding the incidence of benefits and costs of any specific program in question.

In light of the variety of credit programs, it is

simply not possible to make firm statements with broad applicability.

We

must rely on available data and analyses.
In an intriguing study of the home mortgage purchase program of the
Government National Mortgage Association, George Von Furstenberg has
shown that the principal

~esult

of that government credit program has not

been to increase the volume of resources going into housing.

Rather, the

credit program has mainly provided arbitrary subsidies to many homeowners

In

who otherwise would have had to pay more for their home mortgages.

addition, many of them could have obtained private financing in the absence of the government subsidy.111
Most frequently the improved terms take the form of an interest rate
that is lower than the rate charged to private borrowers.

Also, the

length of the loan and the loan-to-value ratio may be more favorable.

In

addition, subsidies may result from inadequate fees or premiums which do
not cover administrative costs and losses on credit guarantees.

At the

p

heart of a subsidy is a political decision to favor some at the expense
of others.
Credit program subsidies may be discussed in terms of (1) the bene+.;t
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The benefit-to-

- 15 borrower concept is perhaps the most attractive to the economist as a
measure of the impact of federal credit aid on demand and on the alloca~

·

,

.

tion of resources.

Yet the benefit concept poses the most formidable

measurement problems.

Some lenders may use the insurance and guaranty

programs simply because they are there, making loans that they would have
made in any case, though on somewhat more stringent terms.

In contrast,

guaranteed loans to submarginal borrowers may be, in principle, as incomegenerating as government transfer payments.
There is no conclusive method of measuring the extent to which loans
under some guarantee programs might have been made without the government
guarantee.

This is particularly true of guaranteed loans at market rates

of interest, such as the regular mortgage insurance program of the Federal
Housing Administration and the Export-Import Bank guarantees.

It is not

clear in such self-supporting programs whether there is a substantial
benefit to the borrower or whether in many cases the borrower would have
been able to obtain nonguaranteed credit on essentially similar terms.
On the other

hand~

many loans would clearly not have been made with-

out the government guarantee.

An extreme example is the loan guarantee

program for public housing, where virtually all of the principal and interest payments are made by the federal government.

That is, the rental

income from public housing projects barely covers current operating and
maintenance expenses, and in some projects not even· those expenses are
p

covered.

Thus the public housing bonds are ultimately retired almost en-

tirely from annual debt service contributions by the federal government.
Consequently, the credit program subsidy for a $10 million bondfinanced public housing project is approximately $10 million, and the
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benefit to the borrower is equivalent to a $10 million cash grant.

It

will not be attempted here to measure the "opportunity costs" to the
~-

government of using its resources for federal loan programs.

That is,

given limited resources, what would be the return to the government (or
to the private sector) from investment in alternative projects?
Table 3 attempts to measure only the value of the interest rate subsidy that accrues to federally-assisted borrowers.

The subsidy is defined

as the difference between the interest rate that the borrower pays under
government assistance and the - rate that would have to be paid for a comparable private loan.

These interest differentials arise in several ways.

The interest rates used in the government credit program may be set by
law below those prevailirig in private markets.

Alternatively, the in-

terest rates may be set at the Treasury's borrowing costs, providing
private borrowers credit at low rates otherwise available only to the
federal government.

In the case of the loan guarantees, the guarantee

provides an implicit subsidy by eliminating the risk to the lender of loss
through default.

This ordinarily enables the borrower to obtain the lower

interest rate which is usually associated with less risky investments.
As an estimate of the interest rates that would be available to
private borrowers in the absence of federal credit programs, a 10 percent
rate has been assumed here.

That figure is considered to be a reasonable

estimate of the average private sector cost of borrowing.

Because in-

terest subsidies occur throughout the life of a loan, the calculation of
interest subsidies requires the conversion of a stream of payments into
a single "present value." This capitalization is performed by discounting
future subsidies by 10 percent a year before accumulating them into a

Table 3
INTEREST SUBSIDIES IN FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
(Fiscal Year 1975, Doilars in millions)

Agency and Program

Borrower Loan Terms
Percent
Years

Annual
Subsidy
Per $100
million

Commitments

Cumulative
Subsidy

Direct Loans

I

I'

.......

Funds appropriated to the President:
International security assistance
International development assistance

6.0
4.0

Agriculture:
Price support
CCC: Public Law 480
Farmers Home Administration
Rural Electrification Administration
Health, Education, and Welfare:
Education and health education
Medical facilities
Housing and Urban Development:
Urban renewa 1
Low-rent public housing
Federal Housing Administration
Government National Mortgage Assn.
Housing for elderly

40.0

2.5
5.2

437
478

69
243

7.1
2.3
5.2
5.5

2.1
33.0
33.7
35.0

1.6
6.1
4.1
3.9

1,101
747
4,481
1,241

33
436
1,758
398

3.0
6.7

15.0
25.0

4.6
2.7

380
30

133
7

6.8

.7
1.5
40.0
27.0

1. 8

8.4

493
82
842
11,779

6
9
39
1,371

---

10.0

9.5
8. 5"
9.8

40.0

1.2
.2

Veterans Administration:
Insurance policy loans
Education loans
Housing

5.0
6.5
9.0

15.0
6.0
29.4

3.4
2.1
.9

152
1
369

40

District of Columbia

8.0

30.0

1.7

232

38

Export-Import Bank

8.1

6.0

1.1

3,813

191

Federal Financing Bank (net)

7.8

5.0

1.3

1,125

57

Federal Home Loan Bank Board

8.0

30.0

1.8

1,305

219

i

-40

"'

.5

< -

*

30

c:;, •

Table 3 (continued)

Borrower Loan Terms
Percent
Years

Agency and Program

Annual
Subsidy
Per $100
million

Commitments

Cumulative
Subsidy

Direct Loans
Small Business Administration:
Business and investment loans
Disaster loan fund

6.9
5.3

8.7
11.0

1.9
3.0

United States Railway Association

7.5

20.0

2.5

31
48

279
241

5,156

Total--Major subsidized direct loans
Guaranteed Loans

~

Health, Education, and Welfare:
Health maintenance organizations
Medical facilities
Student loan insurance

7.0
6.7
4.4

20.0
25.0
13.0

2.3
2.7
3.7

1,299

Housing and Urban Development:
Urban renewal
Low-rent public housing
Mortgage insurance (subsidized)

4.6
5.0

.7
41.5
40.0

6.5
7.8
4.4

493
741
476

206

Interior:

8.0

20.0

1.5

6.3

40.0

3.3

177

58

Indian loans

Department of Transportation:

WMATA

22
345

89

21
566

1,217

Total--Major subsidized guaranteed loans
Agency Debt Issues Financed By
Federal Financing Bank
Tennessee Valley Authority

8.0

3.0

1.1

1,435

41

U.S. Postal Service

8.0

3.0

1.1

1,000

29
70
6,443

Total--Debt issue subsidies
Grand total
* Less than $0.5 million.

,.

.

Source:

Same as Table 1.

.. ,

'

~

f

.:..• •

- 19 -

single amount.
The results are shown in Table 3. On the basis of the as$umptions
made here, federal credit extended in the . fiscal year 1975 will generate
$6.4 billion of subsfdies during the life of the loans made during that

twelve month period.

That amount is equal to about 7 percent of the total

federal and federally-assisted credit provided during that year.

The

proportion of subsidy to total amount of the loan, however, varies substantially from program to program.

Unlike subsidies in other federal

spending programs, credit subsidies tend to be hidden.

Hence, their

magnitude remains generally unknown to either the public or to most
governmental decision-makers.
The Foreseeable Trend
The upward trend in the size and number of federal credit programs
shows no signs of slowing down.

During the last few years, the Congress

has approved a new loan guarantee program to assist industry in the commercial development of energy from geothermal resources (the Geothermal
Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974), voted credit
to the nation's largest city (the New York City Seasonal Financing Act),
and authorized the Federal Energy Administration to guarantee loans for
new underground coal mines (the Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
I \

)

In

addition, several congressional committees have held hearings on proposed
legislation to provide as much as $100 billion for credit assistance via
an Energy Independence Authority.

In November 1976, the governors of

seven northeastern states called for the creation of a Regional Energy
·Development Corporation, which would use federally guaranteed bonds to
finance coal · development and other projects to foster regional growth.

I

I
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In December 1975, the Farmers Home Administration (an agency of the
~.S.

Department of Agriculture) expanded its credit operations to provide

up to a 90 percent guarantee on private loans that companies obtain for
use on plants in rural areas.

There has been little if any offsetting

reductions during recent years in the scope of existing federal credit
activities.
The future expansions in government credit programs are also likely
to be qualitatively different from existing loan and guarantee activities.
Currently, the major loan guarantee programs, such as those of the Federal
Housing Administration, are secured generally by readily marketable assets, such as real estate, inventories, and production equipment.

The

individual loan risks are $mall; broadly diversified portfolios reduce
the risks for the program as a whole.
But many of the proposed new loan guarantee programs, especially in
the energy

ar~a,

have very different risk characteristics.

According to

Norman H. Jones, Jr., the typical project whose financing would be
guaranteed would be far larger, in both absolute size and relative to the
tqtal credit program.

This would clearly be the case for a $1 billion

project in a $6 billion synthetic fuel program.

New energy developments

involve substantial technical uncertainty and doubt as to the costs and
profitapility of the project, even in the event of technical success.
~oreover,the

assets to be pledged as collateral would be highly specialized
and perhaps not readily marketable. 121
Thus the relative and absolute risks involved in some of the proposed

extensions of government credit power miqht be much greater than in the
-past.

The same might also be true in the case of long-term credit extensions
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by the federal government to municipalities facing severe financial pressures.

The point being made here is not to oppose automatically every

proposed extension of governmental credit.
understanding
f

t~e

Rather, the concern is with

full extent of the contingent liability that is being

.

assumed, contingent liabilities which could result in federal assumption
of large amounts of unpaid debts.

In such event, the guarantee mechanism

would become a major subsidy, which the Congress might or might not wish
to vote for were it deciding the matter directly.
Summary
Contrary to the popular view, government credit programs are not costless, either to the
cos~s

Treas~ry

or to citizens in general.

Three distinct

of these government programs can be identified:

1. The economic cost.

As they do little if anything to increase the

total supply of investment funds in the economy, government credi.t
programs take credit away from some unsubsidized borrowers.

An

economic cost results from the operations of federal credit programs
to the extent that the contribution to society of the credit recipients
is less than that of the unsubsidized borrowers who were rationed out
of the market.
2.

The initial fiscal cost.

Government credit programs increase the

total size of government-related borrowings -- a broad category which
ranges from the Treasury's own securities to the private issues which
are guaranteed by federal government agencies.

To a considerable ex-

tent, the investment community looks upon all of these items as government-related, although individual investors may distinguish between
Treasury securities and issues of the credit agencies.

As a result
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of these interdependencies, an expansion in the total volume of government-related credit results in a higher level of interest rates being
paid by that entire category.

The fiscal cost to the government arises

because some portion of those higher interest rates (the part servicing the public debt) is a direct charge to the federal budget.
3. The ultimate fiscal cost.

When defaults occur on the part of the bor-

rowers whose credit is guaranteed by the federal government, the
Treasury winds up bearing the ultimate cost of the credit.

In such

cases, government credit programs become a form of backdoor spending,
whereby federal expenditures are incurred in the absence of direct
appropriations for the purpose.
Several ways have been suggested to deal with the various problems
that arise from the expansion of federal credit programs.

One general ap-

proach is to require that all proposals to create new federal credit. programs or to broaden existing ones be accompanied by a detailed analysis.
This appraisal would result in a quantification of the subsidy by showing
the relationship between (a) the interest rate actually charged to the
borrower participating in the federal credit program, (b) the rate which
would be charged by competitive and efficient private lenders, and (c)
the rate necessary to cover the government's costs, including the possibility of default.
One way of controlling federal credit programs is to impose a ceil. ,J
'<

•

ing on the total borrowing of federal and federally-sponsored credit
agencies, both those 11 in 11 and those 11 0Ut 11 of the budget -- thus restricting their ability to extend credit.

In addition, the Congress could

enact a ceiling on the overall volume of debt created under federal loan
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guarantees.
vi~w

It would be important to establish procedures to permit re-

of commitments far enough in advance to permit evaluating their

likely impact when the commitments become actual loans.
~--

A variation of the first approach is to establish controls over the
total volume of federally-assisted credit directly.

Even though no im-

mediate impact on the federal budget may be visible in most cases, the
influence on the allocation of resources

and on the composition of in-

come and employment -- may be very considerable.

At present, many of

these federal credit programs tend to have virtually a blank check on
the nation's credit resources.

Under this second method, they would no

longer be treated as a 11 free good ...
A third method of c6ntrollin9 federal credit programs more effectively is to require these credit programs to be reviewed and coordinated
along with other federal programs in the preparation of the
annual budget and economic plans.

governme~t's

At the present time, numerous federal

credit programs -- guaranteed and insured loans, and loans by federallysponsored enterprises -- escape regular budget and program review.
Perhaps the .most fundamental proposal for dealing with the problem
of federal credit does not relate to these credit programs at all, but
with the underlying conditions of which they are symptoms.

Hence, if we

can create an economic climate more conducive to private saving and investment, that will reduce the need for private borrowers to seek federal
credit assistance.

The creation of that climate may require a tax system

which tilts in favor of saving rather than consumption and a fiscal
policy which avoids the large Treasury deficits whose financing competes
with private borrowers.

Until these fundamental changes are achieved,

continued pressures for expansion of federal credit programs seems likely.
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